Archives for posts with tag: bankruptcy

I’ve had three working papers made available on SSRN recently. One is economic history, another one is political economy, and the third one is contract theory. Two of them are related to free banking, and two are related to insolvency. In order of pre-publication:

  1.  Free Banking and Economic Growth in Lower Canada, 1817-1851, with Vincent Geloso

    Generally, the historical literature presents the period from 1817 to 1851 in Lower Canada (modern day Québec) as one of negative economic growth. This period also coincides with the rise of free banking in the colony. In this paper we propose to study the effects of free banking on economic growth using theoretical and empirical validations to study the issue of whether or not economic growth was negative. First of all, using monetary identities, we propose that given the increase in the stock of money and the reduction in the general price level, there must have been a positive rate of economic growth during the period. We also provide complementary evidence drawn from wages that living standards were increasing. It was hence impossible for growth to have been negative. Secondly, we propose that the rise of privately issued paper money under free banking in the colony had the effect of mitigating the problem of the abundance of poor quality coins in circulation which resulted from legal tender legislation. It also had the effect of facilitating credit networks and exchange. We link this conclusion to the emergence of free banking which must have been an important contributing factor. Although we cannot perfectly quantity the effect of free banking on economic growth in Lower Canada, we can be certain that its effect on growth was clearly positive.

  2. Robust Political Economy and the Insolvency Resolution of Large Financial Institutions

    This research applies the robust political economy framework to a comparative institutional analysis of large US financial institutions insolvency procedures. The regimes investigated will be the bailout of financial institutions, Dodd-Frank Act’s Orderly Liquidation Authority, both through procedures that follow original intent and through a ‘bail-in’ route, and 3 bankruptcy possibilities including Chapter 11, a so-called “Chapter 14,” and a mandatory auction mechanism used as a benchmark. We study the robustness of these regimes’ procedures through 5 criteria, both ex ante and ex post. These are the initiation of insolvency procedures, Too-big-to-fail moral hazard, the filtering mechanism, the allocation of resources, and their alleged systemic externalities containment abilities.

  3. In Which Context is the Option Clause Desirable?

    The option clause is a contractual device from free banking experiences meant to prevent banknote redemption duels. It has been used within the Diamond and Dybvig [Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig. 1983. “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity.” Journal of Political Economy 91 (3): 401-419] framework to suggest that very simple contractual solutions can act as an alternative to deposit insurance. This literature has however been ambiguous on whether the option clause can replace deposit insurance outside of those two contexts. It will be argued that the theoretical clause does not generally affect the likelihood that a solvent bank goes bankrupt because of a bank run, as empirical evidence suggests it is already near null, and that the exercise of the clause will have the effect of diminishing the size of creditor claims on bank assets because it exacerbates the agency problem of bank debt. It will therefore be argued that the clause is only desirable in (a) free banking systems that are historically devoid of bank runs in the first place and have other means of managing debt-related agency problems, and (b) under the unrealistic assumption that bank runs are self-fulfilling prophecies. It will be argued that the agency problem of bank debt make the option clause undesirable outside of free banking systems.

There’s more where those came from, I might add another one soon, on bankruptcy theory.

For an Institute for Humane Studies program I wanted to participate in you had to write a short essay on how a famous article or book is misguided and inimical to liberty. I wrote the essay below for the occasion, and I’m pretty happy of how it turned out, so I’m sharing it here. Some readers will instantly recognize the heavy influence of chapter 6 of Lawrence H. White’s Theory of Monetary Institutions—get this book.

The seminal paper by Diamond & Dybvig (1983) on bank runs is misguided and inimical to liberty. It suggests that banks are inherently unstable, always on the verge of suffering a “redemption run” at any unrelated ‘sunspot,’ and that it is absolutely necessary that bank runs be suppressed, and that deposit insurance is the most effective way to do it. In their model, if banks ought to survive it has to be through intervention into the financial system. The basic features of this model are still present in most publications on financial stability to this day.

First, unlike the model would suggest, bank runs are generally not responsible for the initial shock. Gorton (1988) studies the National Banking Era in the US, and finds that for each of the 7 crisis he identifies, bank runs were rather the result of a previous event announcing a possible depreciation of banking assets. Likewise, Calomiris (1991) finds that over 1875–1913 all banking panics (generalized run on all banks) happened within the quarter following an abrupt increase in business failures. Mishkin (1991) studies bank panics from 1857 to 1988, and finds that for all but that of 1873, panics occur well after the recession has started.

Secondly, banks that do go bankrupt because of a bank run are those that are pre-run insolvent. Banks that are solvent can generally borrow from other banks and other institutions, historically clearinghouses, have a large repertoire of possible solutions to help banks is crisis. While bank runs and associated liquidity problems can be aggravating factors, even in the worst bank panic episodes they are causes of bank failure only in exceptional circumstances (Kaufman 1987, 1988). Even in the most fruitful historical era in terms of banking panics and runs, the American National Banking Era, runs were a primary cause of failure in only one case out of 594 bank bankruptcies (Calomiris 1991, 154). Calomiris & Mason (1997) study the banking panic of June 1932 in Chicago and find that no pre-run solvent banks failed. Reviewing this literature, Benston & Kaufman (1995, 225) conclude that “the policy implications of the Diamond & Dybvig (1983) model are not very useful for understanding the workings of the extant banking and payments system.”

A third reason is that most runs have in fact been partial “verification” runs. Depositors eventually figure out that the bank will likely survive the crisis, and runs stop. This is impossible in the Diamond & Dybvig (1983) framework; once initiated the run must always go through and make the bank fail. Ó Gráda & White (2003) study a single bank from the 1850s. They investigate depositor behavior through individual account data, and particularly through the panics of 1854 and 1857. The bank survived both. They find that runs are not sudden, but involve a learning mechanism where random beliefs are progressively dropped, while behavior motivated by legitimate signals become more important over time. Panic does not displace learning in the market processes of bank runs.

Finally, if Diamond & Dybvig (1983) is correct, it should apply to all fractional-reserve banking systems without deposit insurance. But, as evidenced by the US-centric literature cited, bank runs are much more common in U.S. history than elsewhere, and bank panics are specific to the American National Banking Era and attributable to bank regulation of that era, such as the ban on branch banking that made mergers with insolvent banks impossible, and the bond deposit system that limited emission at a critical time (Smith 1991). Bordo (1990, 24) compares bank panics internationally and comments that “the difference in the incidence of panics is striking.” While over the 1870–1933 the US had four panics, there were none in Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Canada despite the fact that “in all four countries, the quantitative variables move similarly during severe recessions to those displayed here for the U.S.” Table 2-1 in Schwartz (1988, 38–39) report that from 1790 to 1927 the U.S. experienced 14 panics, while the Britain, the only other country with as many observation, experienced 8, all of them before 1867.

Not only does Diamond & Dybvig (1983) suggest bank runs have much higher costs than evidence does, but it also shrouds its benefits. My research suggests that bank runs could play an important role in initiating insolvency procedures earlier, before the bank can enlarge its losses, and therefore limit systemic externalities.

One justification for the very broad powers of the regulators in the Dodd-Frank Act Title II’s Orderly Liquidation Authority mechanisms is that it would allow the FDIC to act very quickly. This usually means “act very quickly once the process is initiated,” but one key aspect of insolvency resolution is that it also has to be initiated quickly, so as to limit shareholder and manager moral hazard to make things even worse.

Yet, the initiation of insolvency procedures in Dodd-Frank follows from a so-called “three key turning” mechanism. The first key is that the Treasury secretary has to suggest that the firm is “in default or in danger of default,”‘ and have consulted with the President (possibly the fourth key). The second and third key are that two-thirds of the Federal Reserve board, and two-thirds of either the Security and Exchange Commission board for investment banks, two-thirds of the Federal Insurance Office board for insurance companies, or two-thirds of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation board must have recommended the initiation of resolution procedures. As should be apparent, this process requires the coordination of multiple agencies, and multiple board members, and is unlikely to be triggered rapidly, if only because of coordination considerations.

Moreover, because initiating insolvency resolution is an admission of failure of prior control, and because the costs of delaying the initiation are essentially shifted onto the FDIC that manages the resolution process, there’s incentives not to recognize the insolvency or to keep hush about it. This was a huge problem for example during the 1980’s Savings & Loans crisis, where insolvent thrifts remained opened for an average period of 17 months before resolutions were initiated, and in a few cases for as much as ten years. The 1993 FDIC Improvement Act sought to fix this problem, by giving the FDIC power to initiate procedures itself, rather than having to rely on the bank’s primary regulator, and by allowing the FDIC to act before the bank is effectively insolvent through what is called “prompt corrective action.” This has, however, obviously not been a success, as in most cases of bank failures during 2008-2009 there were no prompt corrective actions taken, and procedures were initiated after the bank’s equity had dropped in negative territory. This means that, even without rules that require the coordination of multiple agencies with possibly misalligned incentives, regulators’ incentives and knowledge problem generally pushes the initiation of insolvency procedures back.

We actually do have something close enough to a benchmark to see how hard it might be for all “3 keys” to agree and coordinate. The Systemic Risk Exemption of the 1993 FDIC Improvement Act has a similar mechanism, where it required a two-third vote of the FDIC’s board, a two-third vote of the Fed’s Board of Governors, and the Treasury Secretary who has to consult with the President. Triggering this exemption allows the FDIC to bypass the “least cost resolution” provisions of the FDICIA, and allows it to be more generous with its “insurance” fund, providing larger coverage to “uninsured” depositors than is usually the case. It’s essentially an institutionalized bailout procedure.

Despite the fact that it would have allowed the FDIC a lot more flexibility, the Systemic Risk Exemption was triggered only 3 times in nearly 20 years. All 3 cases are recent, as those are Citigroup, Bank of America and Wachovia. In the case of Wachovia, those powers were ultimately not used, as Wells Fargo purchased it instead. This is suggestive that those powers are hard to invoke and use, and might suggest something about triggering the Orderly Liquidation Authority. On the other hand, it is true that the Systemic Risk Exemption could have been triggered much more often under a director that is more bailout-happy than Sheila Bair was (say, Geithner for example).

Given those features of the Orderly Resolution Authority, there’s a chance that initiation might be delayed. Delayed initiation means larger losses, more adverse market reactions, and stronger temptations to bailout, with accompanying calls for further regulation.

Why am I telling you all this? Well, ZeroHedge posted a very revealing figure, detailing the new European Bank Resolution directives and what could be called its “8 key turning mechanism”…

Thus, the right to terminate or close-out financial market contracts is important to the stability of financial market participants in the event of an insolvency and reduces the likelihood that a single insolvency will trigger other insolvencies due to the nondefaulting counterparties’ inability to control their market risk. The right to terminate or close-out protects federally supervised financial institutions, such as insured banks, on an individual basis, and by protecting both supervised and unsupervised market participants, protects the markets from systemic problems of “domino failures.”

Source: Ireland, Oliver. 1999. “Testimony of Oliver Ireland, Associate General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, on the proposed Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999.” Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, Committee on the Judiciary. U.S. House of Representatives, March 18.

Qualified financial contracts privileges to avoid bankruptcy stay, greatly expanded by a 2005 amendment to bankruptcy laws, were one of the principal source of so-called “disorderly” liquidation during in Fall of 2008, and the main motivation behind most of the 2008 bailouts. It became a primary source of “systemic risk.” See Roe, Mark J. 2011. “Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator.” Stanford Law Review 63 (3): 539-590.

File in “systemic risk exaggerations.”

Source: Cihak, Martin, and Erlend Nier. 2009. The Need for Special Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions—The Case of the European Union. IMF Working paper. September.

[T]he mischief takes a wide range. Those who have been accommodated with loans must pay, whatever their readiness or ability to do so. Further advances cannot be obtained. Other banks must call in their loans and refuse to extend credit in order to fortify themselves against the uneasiness and even terror of their own depositors. Confidence is destroyed. Enterprises are stopped. Business is brought to a standstill. Securities are enforced. Property is sacrificed, and disaster spreads from locality to locality. All these incidents of the banking business are matters of common knowledge and experience.

Court of Kansas. 1911. Schaake v. Dolley, 118 p. 80, 83 (Kansas denying a charter to a new bank because “the economy could not support another bank”).

Unfortunately, the decision to close an insolvent bank rests with banking regulators, who do not personally internalize the costs of delay. Regulators who prematurely close a solvent financial institution will offend the shareholders, managers, employees, and depositors of that institution. But regulators who permit an insolvent financial institution to remain open after it should be closed rarely are blamed because the costs of keeping such institutions open are widely dispersed among taxpayers, who must provide the funds necessary to bail out the deposit insurance funds.

Page 1133 of Macey, Johnathan R. and Geoffrey P. Miller. 1993. “Kaye, Scholer, FIRREA, and the Desirability of Early Closure: A View of the Kaye, Scholer Case From the Perspective of Bank Regulatory Policy.” Southern California Law Review 66,  p.1115-1143.

Here’s something I wrote, up for comments. Here’s the abstract:

A 2000 paper by Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton, and Mathias Dewatripont off ers a model where what they describe as a free banking system is vulnerable to contagious bank runs through clearinghouse loans. The paper ignores key contributions to both free banking and financial history literature, such that the paper is of little relevance to the understanding of the stability of both free banking systems and clearinghouse arrangements. Our criticism concentrates on the institutions of banking absent or misrepresented. It is argued that it is not clear whether the paper even features banks.

Thirteen years is a very long delay for a comment, but I was not able to find anything addressing this paper, and since it is still cited in almost every literature review on systemic risk, I thought it deserved a comment. Suffice to say, I don’t think think free banking can be dismissed in 6 pages, without giving a proper definition and citing any work on the subject matter.

My usual collaborators in our department seem to be abroad or on vacation this week, so please think of this as a crowdsourced seminar and please do leave a comment.

Most papers on the random withdrawal theory of bank runs suggest that bank runs are not only self-fulfilling prophecies, that alone is bad enough, but that once the run is motion nothing can stop it. This has serious implications, if bank runs are self-fulfilling prophecies that can’t be stopped then you would expect that there would be a lot of bank failures that are only due to bank runs. You’d expect there would be contagious bank runs. Especially during the National Banking era, which was rife with banking panics. This table suggests otherwise.

Source: p. 183 of U.S. Comptroller of the Currency. Annual Report Vol. 1 1920. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Source: p. 183 of U.S. Comptroller of the Currency. Annual Report Vol. 1 1920. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Out of 594 bank failures during the National banking era, only 9 had bank runs as their primary cause. Out of those 9, two were banks closed in anticipation of runs. Out of the remaining 7 bank failures, 6 were eventually restored to solvency by the receivership, so I’m going to assume the losses weren’t that important. Only 4 bank failures out of those 9 occured before the advent of the Federal Reserve, including one case where the bank was closed prior to the run, and the bank that was not restored to solvency by the receivership.

Other bank failures might have been sped up by bank runs, but it was not the primary cause of failure. This means that the run, while certainly costly, might have been salutary and closed down the bank before its managers could enlarge losses. It also suggests that bank runs are, in most cases at least, not self-fulfilling prophecies, and that partial “verification” runs can occur.

So, what this means is that, over the whole National Banking Era, we only have only one potential case of contagious bank run leading to an unsalvable bank failure. I say potential and not definitive, because it might be the case that the failure was, after all, more a result of predation than a result of the bank run. What I mean by that is that it is pretty much always in the interest of other banks, and clearinghouses, to come to the rescue of banks in difficulty, because they can profit from those situations. It wouldn’t be surprising to me that what appears to be the only national bank failure due to contagious bank runs, is actually a case of other banks letting it die so that it can acquire its assets at a discount.

More research is obviously necessary on all of this, especially on the outcome of the receiverships.


Source: page 90 of O’Connor, J. F. T. 1938. The Banking Crisis and Recovery under the Roosevelt Administration. Chicago: Callaghan and Co.

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