Here is my contribution to the happy birthday blog posts that were shared on the occasion of Mario Rizzo’s birthday. Mario was a great influence on my thinking, as well as a pivotal influence on Austrian economics. Read all of the contributions, by Andreas Hoffmann, Jerry O’Driscoll, Pete Boettke, Richard Epstein, Israel Kirzner, Dan Klein, Boyan Jovanovic, Steve Horwitz, Tyler Cowen, Frederic Sautet, Vernon Smith, Pablo Duarte, Roger Koppl, Giandomenica Becchio, Larry White, Shruti Rajagopalan, Peter Lewin, Nick Cowen, Sandy Ikeda, Glen Whitman, Malte Dold, and Jeffrey Tucker.

Happy Birthday Mario!


by Mathieu Bédard

On the occasion of Professor Mario Rizzo’s birthday, I’d like to take the opportunity to underline how great an influence he has had on my thinking.

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Puisque le Moodle semble ne pas être disponible pour l’instant, je propose aux étudiants de TSE en Microéconomie: Introduction à l’organisation industrielle L3S5 du diplôme Économie & Société de télécharger le plan de cours/syllabus ici.

Vous pouvez maintenant aussi télécharger les cas vus au dernier cours ici.

I’ve had three working papers made available on SSRN recently. One is economic history, another one is political economy, and the third one is contract theory. Two of them are related to free banking, and two are related to insolvency. In order of pre-publication:

  1.  Free Banking and Economic Growth in Lower Canada, 1817-1851, with Vincent Geloso

    Generally, the historical literature presents the period from 1817 to 1851 in Lower Canada (modern day Québec) as one of negative economic growth. This period also coincides with the rise of free banking in the colony. In this paper we propose to study the effects of free banking on economic growth using theoretical and empirical validations to study the issue of whether or not economic growth was negative. First of all, using monetary identities, we propose that given the increase in the stock of money and the reduction in the general price level, there must have been a positive rate of economic growth during the period. We also provide complementary evidence drawn from wages that living standards were increasing. It was hence impossible for growth to have been negative. Secondly, we propose that the rise of privately issued paper money under free banking in the colony had the effect of mitigating the problem of the abundance of poor quality coins in circulation which resulted from legal tender legislation. It also had the effect of facilitating credit networks and exchange. We link this conclusion to the emergence of free banking which must have been an important contributing factor. Although we cannot perfectly quantity the effect of free banking on economic growth in Lower Canada, we can be certain that its effect on growth was clearly positive.

  2. Robust Political Economy and the Insolvency Resolution of Large Financial Institutions

    This research applies the robust political economy framework to a comparative institutional analysis of large US financial institutions insolvency procedures. The regimes investigated will be the bailout of financial institutions, Dodd-Frank Act’s Orderly Liquidation Authority, both through procedures that follow original intent and through a ‘bail-in’ route, and 3 bankruptcy possibilities including Chapter 11, a so-called “Chapter 14,” and a mandatory auction mechanism used as a benchmark. We study the robustness of these regimes’ procedures through 5 criteria, both ex ante and ex post. These are the initiation of insolvency procedures, Too-big-to-fail moral hazard, the filtering mechanism, the allocation of resources, and their alleged systemic externalities containment abilities.

  3. In Which Context is the Option Clause Desirable?

    The option clause is a contractual device from free banking experiences meant to prevent banknote redemption duels. It has been used within the Diamond and Dybvig [Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig. 1983. “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity.” Journal of Political Economy 91 (3): 401-419] framework to suggest that very simple contractual solutions can act as an alternative to deposit insurance. This literature has however been ambiguous on whether the option clause can replace deposit insurance outside of those two contexts. It will be argued that the theoretical clause does not generally affect the likelihood that a solvent bank goes bankrupt because of a bank run, as empirical evidence suggests it is already near null, and that the exercise of the clause will have the effect of diminishing the size of creditor claims on bank assets because it exacerbates the agency problem of bank debt. It will therefore be argued that the clause is only desirable in (a) free banking systems that are historically devoid of bank runs in the first place and have other means of managing debt-related agency problems, and (b) under the unrealistic assumption that bank runs are self-fulfilling prophecies. It will be argued that the agency problem of bank debt make the option clause undesirable outside of free banking systems.

There’s more where those came from, I might add another one soon, on bankruptcy theory.

For an Institute for Humane Studies program I wanted to participate in you had to write a short essay on how a famous article or book is misguided and inimical to liberty. I wrote the essay below for the occasion, and I’m pretty happy of how it turned out, so I’m sharing it here. Some readers will instantly recognize the heavy influence of chapter 6 of Lawrence H. White’s Theory of Monetary Institutions—get this book.

The seminal paper by Diamond & Dybvig (1983) on bank runs is misguided and inimical to liberty. It suggests that banks are inherently unstable, always on the verge of suffering a “redemption run” at any unrelated ‘sunspot,’ and that it is absolutely necessary that bank runs be suppressed, and that deposit insurance is the most effective way to do it. In their model, if banks ought to survive it has to be through intervention into the financial system. The basic features of this model are still present in most publications on financial stability to this day.

First, unlike the model would suggest, bank runs are generally not responsible for the initial shock. Gorton (1988) studies the National Banking Era in the US, and finds that for each of the 7 crisis he identifies, bank runs were rather the result of a previous event announcing a possible depreciation of banking assets. Likewise, Calomiris (1991) finds that over 1875–1913 all banking panics (generalized run on all banks) happened within the quarter following an abrupt increase in business failures. Mishkin (1991) studies bank panics from 1857 to 1988, and finds that for all but that of 1873, panics occur well after the recession has started.

Secondly, banks that do go bankrupt because of a bank run are those that are pre-run insolvent. Banks that are solvent can generally borrow from other banks and other institutions, historically clearinghouses, have a large repertoire of possible solutions to help banks is crisis. While bank runs and associated liquidity problems can be aggravating factors, even in the worst bank panic episodes they are causes of bank failure only in exceptional circumstances (Kaufman 1987, 1988). Even in the most fruitful historical era in terms of banking panics and runs, the American National Banking Era, runs were a primary cause of failure in only one case out of 594 bank bankruptcies (Calomiris 1991, 154). Calomiris & Mason (1997) study the banking panic of June 1932 in Chicago and find that no pre-run solvent banks failed. Reviewing this literature, Benston & Kaufman (1995, 225) conclude that “the policy implications of the Diamond & Dybvig (1983) model are not very useful for understanding the workings of the extant banking and payments system.”

A third reason is that most runs have in fact been partial “verification” runs. Depositors eventually figure out that the bank will likely survive the crisis, and runs stop. This is impossible in the Diamond & Dybvig (1983) framework; once initiated the run must always go through and make the bank fail. Ó Gráda & White (2003) study a single bank from the 1850s. They investigate depositor behavior through individual account data, and particularly through the panics of 1854 and 1857. The bank survived both. They find that runs are not sudden, but involve a learning mechanism where random beliefs are progressively dropped, while behavior motivated by legitimate signals become more important over time. Panic does not displace learning in the market processes of bank runs.

Finally, if Diamond & Dybvig (1983) is correct, it should apply to all fractional-reserve banking systems without deposit insurance. But, as evidenced by the US-centric literature cited, bank runs are much more common in U.S. history than elsewhere, and bank panics are specific to the American National Banking Era and attributable to bank regulation of that era, such as the ban on branch banking that made mergers with insolvent banks impossible, and the bond deposit system that limited emission at a critical time (Smith 1991). Bordo (1990, 24) compares bank panics internationally and comments that “the difference in the incidence of panics is striking.” While over the 1870–1933 the US had four panics, there were none in Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Canada despite the fact that “in all four countries, the quantitative variables move similarly during severe recessions to those displayed here for the U.S.” Table 2-1 in Schwartz (1988, 38–39) report that from 1790 to 1927 the U.S. experienced 14 panics, while the Britain, the only other country with as many observation, experienced 8, all of them before 1867.

Not only does Diamond & Dybvig (1983) suggest bank runs have much higher costs than evidence does, but it also shrouds its benefits. My research suggests that bank runs could play an important role in initiating insolvency procedures earlier, before the bank can enlarge its losses, and therefore limit systemic externalities.

Most people reading this blog are probably already aware of the “dehomogenization” charges lead by Joseph Salerno. In an essay first published in 1992 Salerno argues that Friedrich Hayek’s thought should be dehomogenized from Ludwig von Mises’, strongly implying that the latter is better than the former. This distinction builds on Hutchinson’s (1981) distinction between “Hayek 1” and “Hayek 2.” As the argument goes, somewhere around the publication of the “Economics and Knowledge” essay in 1937, Hayek switched from Mises’ a priorism to Karl Popper’s falsificationism. This assertion is very convincingly challenged by Bruce Caldwell’s 1988 essay, Horwitz’ 2003 essay suggest that there really isn’t much to heterogeneity and that if there is any it’s complementary, and you’ll find an interesting discussion arguing that Hayek in fact was methodologically a Misesian in Roger Koppl’s Big Players and the Economic Theory of Expectations, and also arguing interesting bits and pieces on this debate in Pete Boettke’s Living Economics, among many other essays. Readers might also enjoy the numerous posts on the topic over at Punto de Vista Economico.

I’ve been reading Ross B. Emmett’s 2007 essay titled “Knight’s Challenge (to Hayek): Spontaneous Order Is Not Enough for Governing a Liberal Society” in the volume Liberalism, Conservatism, and Hayek’s Idea of Spontaneous Order edited by Peter McNamara and Louis Hunt. According to Emmett, a constant in Frank Knight’s criticism of Hayek is the role of discussion. This is seen the the capital theory controversy between the two, but also in his reviews of The Road to Serfdom  and The Constitution of Liberty. According to Emmett (p. 69–70);

While the substance of their “capital controversy” need not detain us, Knight drew some interesting conclusions from their exchange regarding the prospects for liberalism; these conclusions foreshadow his criticisms of Hayek some 30 years later. During the controversy the two men corresponded about their differences, and Knight believed they were making progress toward a common understanding through the give-and-take of discussion about specific questions and responses. But then Hayek, unbeknownst to Knight, published an article on the theory of capital that made only a passing reference to Knight’s criticisms. Knight interpreted the article to mean that Hayek would make little effort to respond directly to the specific objections of Knight and others to Austrian capital theory.

Emmett documents how Knight emphasized the role of discussion both from methodological and political philosophy perspectives.  According to Knight, discussion not only has role in science, but also in law making. The idea of a free society for Knight being ‘the search for agreement by discussion, which advances in response to “specific questions” or particular problems, rather than a “systematic exposition” of abstract positions’ (ibid). Knight thought these two forms of discussion, scientific and politic, were absent in Hayek.

Let’s however concentrate on the methodological portion of Knight’s criticism. It is more obvious and explicit in his reply to Hayek’s early work (pre-1937), but it’s really present throughout. What I thought was highly interesting is that, at least in Knight’s criticism, Hayek is the one having a Misesian methodology (Knight calls it a “systematic exposition”) and Knight is the one adopting the more Popperian position concerning the role of discussion among scientists (“the meeting of specific questions is the way to ‘advance knowledge'” from Knight’s 1934 letter quoted in Emmett). I’m not sure whether this is enough of a distinctive and unique trait of Popper’s methodology. It’s pretty central in his French essays but seems not to be really a focus in the Anglo-Saxon secondary literature on Popper.

I would be interested in hearing from people more familiar with Knight and Popper than I am on this topic.

Here’s an interesting CfP that might not have been distributed as widely as it deserves. My understanding is that the initiative is from Prof François Facchini.

The controversies between Hayek and Keynes began in 1929 when Hayek, then a Privatdozent at the University of Vienna, gave lectures at the LSE. The opposition appeared in their respective books Prices and Production, Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, A Treatise on Money and their comments on these books published in journals. Keynes was in favour of an active monetary and fiscal policy, while Hayek thought that money has to be neutralised in order to respect the natural rate of interest and the structure of capital. The controversies continued about the ways to finance the war and the financial system to be established after the war, but both men agreed about the free enterprise. After Keynes’ death, there was an alliance between neoclassical theory and bastard keynesianism, that has eclipsed the economic thinking of Hayek. But in recent decades the decline of keynesianism has awoken hayekienism.

The object of the conference is the controversies between Hayek and Hayekians on one side and Keynes and Keynesians on the other side. These controversies are numerous and various since the ideas of Keynes and Hayek have varied. E.g. the money of the Treatise is not the money of the chapter 13 of the General Theory and the money of Prices and Production or Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle is not the money of Denationalisation of Money and that the ideas of Keynesians and Hayekians are even more numerous.

Therefore the scope of the conference is a priori very large. The scientific committee will study every proposition that may refer to the debate Hayek-Keynes: these propositions may refer to theory and methodology, to history, to economic policies, to the 30’s, to the problems of the present crisis…

The committee includes Post-Keynenesian and Hayekian colleagues. It will select 12 propositions coming from Keynesians and 12 coming from Hayekians and will group them by subject in order to organize debates between the two schools. We remind that Keynes and Hayek, albeit very opposite in ideas, had very cordial relationships. We hope it will be the same for Keynesians and Hayekians during the conference.

Paper submission deadline: July 31, 2014
Communication of Acceptance: August 31, 2014
Final papers due by: October 15, 2014

Download the pdf for more details.

Let him who accepts the message there expounded rewrite the history of the French ancien regime in some such terms as these: Louis XV was a most enlightened monarch. Feel­ing the necessity of stimulating expenditure he secured the services of such expert spenders as Madame de Pompadour and Madame du Barry. They went to work with unsurpassable efficiency. Full employment, a maximum of resulting output, and general well-being ought to have been the conse­quence. It is true that instead we find misery, shame and, at the end of it all, a stream of blood. But that was a chance coincidence.

In Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1936. Review of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money by John Maynard Keynes. Journal of the American Statistical Association 31 (196) : 791-795.

Apparently because of a bug, all Bitcoin transactions from and to Mt. Gox, one of the biggest and oldest Bitcoin exchange, have been indefinitely suspended. This suspension has caused a drop of 20% in Bitcoin value.

This suspension is interesting, because it highlights one of the drawbacks of a transaction system where base money rather than demandable debt is traded. Indeed, one of Bitcoin’s key feature is a secure, encrypted transaction system. When there is a problem with this transaction system, because it is inseparable from the currency, all transactions must come to a halt. Or, like it is the case here, if one exchange has a glitch all of its transactions must be suspended. This is different from how suspensions, or even so-called ‘bank holidays,’ have worked in the past.

Indeed, in monetary systems where transactions were made in notes, coins or scriptures redeemable in base money by the bank that emitted them, the suspensions were, in a sense, much less painful. These claims could still be traded without affecting the bank that emitted them, though they would sometimes stop being accepted at par, particularly if the bank that emitted them couldn’t participate in the clearing system. This is true if the bank had suspended because of solvency or liquidity issues, but it would also be true in the case of software glitch like it seems to be the case here. There could still be “Bitcoin” transactions through these claims, even though they might be temporarily irredeemable into Bitcoins.

One of Bitcoin’s key feature, an inseparable, secure and encrypted transaction system, can also be a weakness until some form of inside money emerges.

Over at Punto de Vista Economico Nicolas Cachanosky has a very enlightening post on the debate hosted by the Online Library of Liberty about Ludwig von Mises’ Theory of Money and Credit that I posted about earlier. The whole thing is worth reading, as well as Nicolas’ various essays on the topic (here and here for example).

In this post I’m going to go further than I did the last post. I am going to claim that there might actually might be room for a reconciliation in the debate over the convergence to 100-percent reserves in free banking. That is, with a small concession one-hundred-percenteers might be able to salvage the idea that competition among free banks would lead to something close enough to a reserve ratio of 100%. This position was argued by Antoine Gentier in his 2003 book “Economie Bancaire: Essai sur les effets de la concurrence et de la réglementation sur le financement du crédit,” but you might also find it elsewhere in English. A short version of the argument is present in Gentier’s forthcoming paper in English in the JEEH.

He argues that in practice both positions are very close to another, because in the end what matters is not a snapshot or an average of reserve ratios, but the marginal reserve ratio. Indeed, “[p]ast money creation is not the main problem because it has already disrupted the economy by changing relative prices. The main problem relies in the ability of the banking system to create new currency now, and further distort the structure of production.” Over the period studied by Gentier (2003), and myself with Gentier (unpublished), while competing banks’ reserve ratio was very low, their marginal reserve ratio was close to 100%. Because of the phenomenon of adverse clearing, competing banks of issue are incapable of wildly expanding their circulation of banknotes. If they did they would be quickly drained of specie, much like was the case of the Ayr Bank in free banking era Scotland (See White 1995, 27-29). This is something Mises agrees to. It means that free banks could not create credit “out of thin air” like it is sometimes claimed, but had to do it almost entirely through accumulation of prior savings. This is one of the reasons that free banks have very high capitalization levels. At the margin, reserve ratios in free banking would indeed be “up very high and possibly close to 100 percent,” to use the words of Hummel.

White, L. H. 1995. Free Banking in Britain: Theory, Experience, and Debate, 1800-1845. 2nd ed. London: The Institute of Economics A ffairs.

The Online Library of Liberty’s Liberty Matters debate forum just hosted a very interesting discussion on Ludwig von Mises’ Theory of Money and Credit (1912). The lead essay is by Lawrence H. White, with comments by Jörg Guido Hülsmann, Jeffrey Hummel, and George Selgin, and a final reply by White.

It contains, among other things, an enlightening reply by White on Mises’ purported disapproval of free banking, and free banking’s supposed procyclicality. Other topics includes a reassessment of the original contributions of Mises’ book and how his “regression theorem” holds up with the emergence of bitcoins.

This passage in Hummel’s comment was of particular interest to me;

[W]e must carefully distinguish between favoring free banking as a legal regime and predicting how it would operate in practice. I think Larry goes too far when he seems to imply that Mises had in mind the kind of free banking that he (1999) and George (1988) predict would emerge without regulation: that is, a system in which reserve ratios are extremely low and banks adjust the money supply to demand in a way that stabilizes velocity. As much as I may agree with their prediction, I can assure them that Sennholz repeatedly affirmed his belief that unregulated competition among banks would drive reserve ratios up very high and possibly close to 100 percent, and he left the impression that such was Mises’s opinion as well.

Of course Hummel knows that both White’s and Sennholz are equally predictions, and admits his own support for the idea that reserve ratios would be extremely low. But what I want to get to is that Sennholz’s predictions are much less supported than White’s are. They are not equal predictions. This is important because elsewhere one-hundred-percenteers have suggested that the market would favor 100% reserves anyway.  White replies to this passage;

Mises in Human Action (p. 446) does quote Cernuschi to the effect that free banking would have narrowed the use of banknotes considerably, and in other ways suggests that reserve ratios under free banking would be, as Hummel puts it, “up very high and possibly close to 100 percent.” If that is Mises’s prediction, then on this point I do depart from Mises. In my 1992 essay that Hummel cites, I criticized Mises for suggesting that free banking would produce reserve ratios close to 100 percent. The best historical evidence we have, from the Scottish free-banking system and other mature systems, shows reserve ratios below 10 percent.

The historical evidence is one way of answering this. In my own research with Antoine Gentier (unpublished) we found that New England’s freest banking systems in terms of both freedom of entry and banking regulation (ie not in the “Free Banking Laws” sense) had similarly low reserve ratios. But there are also theoretical reasons.

Competition over bank’s financial stability does not only occur over reserve ratios. In our study, for example, banks competed over capitalization levels to prove their resilience. But they could also be competing over the liquidity of their assets, their demand debt to total debt ratio, or a variety of  “living will” arrangements (liability regime of shareholders, option clauses, clearinghouse memberships, etc.) just to name a few. I’m going to conjecture (and derogate from Selgin’s comment on the use of statistics), and say that given the prevalence of banknote circulation as a source of banking profit in free banking systems relative to the costs of these other ways banks can prove their financial stability, it is not at all a blind prediction, or one merely supported by historical anecdotes, to say that reserve ratios would be closer to 1% than they would to 100% under free banking. In fact, it would take a particularly unfree institutional environment for competition between banks to lead to 100% reserve ratios.

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